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Abstract 
The relationship between land investment and tenure security is usually tested in land scarce 
but peaceful areas. This article examines instead the effects of land abundance and war for 
investment and tenure security. The paper demonstrates that war enhances land abundance. 
This implies that farm size for the analysis of land investment and tenure security. The paper 
formally tests for land abundance and estimates a system of equations using farm survey data 
from post-war Mozambique. Farm size is found to be a key determinant of both investment 
and tenure security. This raises important policy issues for post-war reconstruction. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large literature analyzing the effects of tenure security on land investments 
(Banerjee et al., 2002, Jacoby et al., 2002, Lanjouw and Levy, 2002). These studies implicitly 
assume that land is a scarce factor of production and abstract from the role of peace and war 
in rural development. This paper uniquely considers the implications of land abundance and 
war on investment and tenure rights. 
The analysis is based on two strands of the rural development literature. The property rights 
literature has recently questioned the direction of causality between investment and tenure 
security: tenure security does not cause higher investment in land but might be induced by it 
(Bruce, 1988). The issue was first tested empirically by Besley (1995). He concluded that 
correcting for this potential endogeneity left the direction of causality from tenure security to 
investment unchanged but affected the estimated size of the tenure coefficients. Baland et al. 
(1999) and Brasselle et al. (2002) also allow for endogeneity between investment and tenure 
rights. In contrast to the preceding literature, they find a reverse causality from investment in 
land to tenure security as farmers use investments such as planting trees to improve their 
tenure rights over the associated land. 
The second strand of literature concerns the implications of land abundance for rural 
development (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987). Land abundance is defined here as the 
sufficient supply and accessibility of arable land. Should land abundance exist, then 
investment and tenure perceptions can be expected to be strongly altered. Civil war, this paper 
argues, enhances the degree of land abundance in a rural economy thus creating an ideal case 
study for the analysis of decisions and tenure insecurity under land abundance. 
The empirical analysis presented here is based on farm survey data from early post-war 
Mozambique, which is often assumed to be a land abundant country. A formal and novel test 
of land abundance is then presented and an econometric test is implemented to identify 
potential endogeneities between investment in land, tenure security and farm size. The 
empirical analysis demonstrates that land abundance must be evaluated at the household and 
village levels, not regionally or nationally as is common in the literature. In addition, it 
demonstrates that war further enhances the degree of land abundance and emphasizes the 
shortage of labor in rural areas. This in turns weakens the post-war supply responses of rural, 
war-affected agriculture. 3 
The findings of this paper therefore complement the two strands of literature on rural 
development by pointing to the primary role of household and farm size in driving post-war 
agricultural production decisions in land abundant areas. With the receding war and aid for 
post-war reconstruction, markets will re-establish themselves and households will 
increasingly face standard incentives and constraints. There exist, however, many isolated and 
war-affected areas in Africa where the common determinants of investment and the 
emergence of property rights are not yet standard practice. 
2. Theory 
2.1. Motivation  
Both land abundance and war potentially cause investment, tenure and farm size to be 
interdependent. Land abundance has strong implications for tropical agriculture as it changes 
the calculus of farmers (Binswanger and McIntire, 1987). Transport and information costs are 
high in areas with a low population density. Given the nature of agricultural production, farms 
are geographically dispersed and markets are fragile. Simple technology and low economies 
of scale dominate in such agricultural systems. Land markets and formal property rights are 
non-existent and land is allocated instead through traditional mechanisms. 
With such low population density and relatively low barriers to land acquisition it is always 
profitable for households to engage in some crop cultivation: there are no landless laborers. 
The costs of labor hiring and supervision, the low economies of scale and the small gains 
from specialization prevent a significant labor market from establishing itself. Consequently, 
households expand the area cultivated with own household labor in the course of the lifecycle 
rather than hiring-in labor. 
Households in land abundant economies are formed as an insurance policy against individual, 
non-covariant risk and in response to an initial asset distribution. Long-term household 
structure, farm size, asset accumulation and social institutions are thus related to the absence 
of technology, formal property rights, and credit markets (Chayanov, 1925, Meillassoux, 
1981: 41). 
War similarly changes the options and the constraints facing households (Collier, 1999, 
Stewart and FitzGerald, 2001, Addison, 2003). In particular, war can affect the quality and 
quantity of land (for example through land mines), the quality and quantity of farm labor (for 
example by drafting working age men into the army or by forcing households to post sentries 4 
during field work), the availability of complementary inputs into agricultural production (for 
example by looting farm machinery), and the functioning of agricultural markets (for example 
by undermining road transport). In addition, the quality of land is indirectly affected by war 
through a lack of investment in land during times of war. Looting and disease, for example, 
may reduce the number of livestock and hence the opportunities for animal husbandry and 
fertilizing. 
Civil war also represents a challenge to the political and legal order, including the system of 
property rights. Under these circumstances, many endowments become exogenous and many 
markets cease to function. For instance, asset endowments such as livestock and tools are pre-
determined and credit markets do not exist. Land on the other hand may be available in 
principle, even if its access at the household level might be regulated by preferences, 
production constraints and social norms. These dimensions of the post-war environment 
constitute a defining feature of this case study. 
Hence war has an impact on investment in land, tenure security and farm size in three ways. 
First, war enhances the degree of land abundance in directly war-affected rural areas. This is 
achieved by reducing the effective supply of labor, by reducing the returns to legal economic 
activity and by preventing markets from functioning properly. Second, war has a direct effect 
on formal property rights, thus potentially raising the incentive to establish informal property 
rights through land-based investments in the post-war period. Third, war is a common 
determinant, albeit indirectly, of investment, tenure and farm size. It is therefore important to 
test for endogeneity between these variables and to control explicitly for the effects of war in 
the empirical analysis. 
2.2. Conceptual Framework 
This section presents a conceptual framework of land investment, tenure security and farm 
size. Consider the utility maximization problem of a farm household where utility is a 
function of output and leisure and where household i, through the allocation of labor (Li), can 
influence investments in land (Ii). Tenure security Ti and area farmed Ai are given. Assuming 
that the underlying functions have desirable properties, that the labor supply does not exceed 
the household labor endowment and that an internal maximum can be obtained, then the 
constrained maximization of preferences will yield a set of reduced form equations (Baland et 
al., 1999). 5 
In the traditional literature on the effects of tenure security on land investment, the key 
equation can be summarized as follows (Feder and Onchan, 1987, Place and Hazell, 1993): 
(1a) Ii =  f  (  LIi, FIi, KIi, VI, Ti ) 
where the subscript I denotes investment-specific variables for each of the vectors household 
labor characteristics L, household field characteristics F, household capital endowments 
including social capital K, and village specific effects V. 
The more recent literature allowing for potential endogeneity between tenure security and 
land investment estimates the following system of equations (Besley, 1995, Baland et al., 
1999, Brasselle et al., 2002): 
(1b) Ii =  f  (  LIi, FIi, KIi, VI, Ti ) 
(2b) Ti =  f  (  LTi, FTi, KTi, VT, Ii ) 
where area farmed is again assumed given. 
Under land abundance, the area farmed cannot be taken as given anymore and endogeneity 
between investment, tenure and cultivated area has to be tested explicitly thus suggesting the 
following system of equations: 
(1c) Ii =  f  (  LIi, FIi, KIi, VI, Ti, Ai ) 
(2c) Ti =  f  (  LTi, FTi, KTi, VT, Ii, Ai ) 
(3c) Ai =  f  (  LAi, FAi, KAi, VA, Ii, Ti ) 
This system of equations will be tested empirically below. The equations do not include a 
credit equation as there are no formal credit transactions in land abundant areas. A yield 
equation has been omitted as no suitable data for plot-level yields is available in the dataset 
described below. This is mainly due to households practicing intercropping for all crops 
except cotton, which is not grown by all households in the sample. In addition, the analysis 
applies to only one year, making the time frame too short to consider household size as an 
endogenous variable. 6 
2.3. Hypotheses 
In a perfectly land abundant economy, area can be accessed easily and farm households will 
maintain a constant land:labor ratio. In a perfectly land-constrained economy, on the other 
hand, farm households control a given area of land throughout the life cycle of the farm 
household. An increase in household size would cause the land-labor ratio to drop. The per 
capita land endowment elasticity of household size (that is the coefficient on the variable 
“number of economically active household members” in the farm size regression) should 
hence lie between 0 for the case of perfect land abundance and -1 for the case of perfect land 
scarcity. Given that the regression controls for a range of factors (including the effects of 
war), this is the most comprehensive and first formal test of land abundance proposed in the 
literature. 
Six interactions between these variables are potentially endogenous, which will be tested 
empirically below. In equation (1c) more tenure security may have a positive effect on land 
investment, as this will reduce the investment risk in the absence of formal property rights. 
This effect is therefore expected to operate in line with the traditional literature. Extending the 
farm size implies less resources are available for improving the quality of the area farmed. 
This trade off hence implies a negative effect of area on investment. 
In equation (2c) higher land investment may have a positive effect on tenure security, as 
argued by the more recent literature on investment and property rights. The area farmed may 
have a negative effect on tenure security as households trade off a higher quantity of land for 
a lower tenure status. 
In equation (3c) more land investment may have a negative effect on area farmed, as this 
might represent a more intensive and smaller scale production. Tenure security is expected to 
have a negative effect on area farmed, given the potential for trade off between the quality 
and the quantity of land. For example, farmers may choose to cultivate some fallow land if a 
competing claim on that land emerges as a result of refugees returning to their original place 
of settlement. 
3. The Case of Post-War Mozambique 
These hypotheses will be tested with household survey data from post-war northern 
Mozambique. The country provides a suitable case study as it has a low population density 
and experienced a severe civil war until 1992. The Mozambican economy was badly damaged 7 
by the civil war, which took place mainly in rural areas. For example, the number of cattle in 
Mozambique declined from over 1.3 million in 1982 to 0.25 million in 1992 (Ministério da 
Agricultura, 1994). Per capita food production only reached 90 percent of its pre-war level by 
1996 (World Bank, 2002). At the same time, farm productivity in the post-war period 
continued to remain well below regional averages (Tschirley and Weber, 1994). 
The north of Mozambique is often considered the “green belt” of the country. Post-war 
agricultural production was hampered by poor transport networks and the absence of 
irrigation and mechanized agricultural production. The post-war population density varied 
between 10 and 50 inhabitants per square kilometer across districts. There were few 
agricultural or non-agricultural employment opportunities and no migrant workers, unlike in 
southern Mozambique. For example, only 11 percent of all rural households occasionally or 
regularly employed agricultural labor (UNDP, 1999). Judging from the farm household data 
of the FSP survey, local agricultural crop markets were the most important and, occasionally, 
the only existing markets in the north. Northern Mozambique was quite isolated for many 
months each year both during the war and the post-war period.  
There are practically no rural landless households in northern Mozambique. Land is generally 
allocated through traditional mechanisms (Marule, 1998). These factors suggest that the 
analysis of land in the north should take into account the role of traditional authorities and 
kinship groups, in addition to the usual exogenous variables. In fact, the ethnic composition of 
the population and the traditional culture in rural areas was little affected by the war. 
4. Data and Estimation Issues 
The farm household survey used for this analysis includes 371 randomly selected households 
in 16 villages (the primary sampling units, PSU) in three districts in Nampula and Cabo 
Delgado provinces in northern Mozambique (MAP/MSU Research Team, 1996). The sample 
was stratified according to households’ cotton growing status. The sample is broadly 
representative of Nampula and Cabo Delgado provinces in northern Mozambique in 1995. 
The survey data, here denoted FSP, was collected by the Food Security Project at the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Maputo, from June 1994 to January 1996. The main weakness of the survey is 
that it, quite naturally, misrepresents the history of the war by focusing on surviving 
individuals and households and not recording war-related deaths. Overall, FSP is one of the 
most carefully designed, collected, and cleaned rural household surveys from the early post-
war period in Mozambique. 8 
The first dependent variable INVEST is defined as the actual number of land-related 
investment projects per household (Table 1). On average, 69.5 percent of all households 
undertook at least one investment project. Investments in fruit trees and cashew trees were the 
most common activities, with about 40 percent of all activities belonging to each group. The 
remainder is split between other, not further specified activities (9 percent), crop storage (7 
percent) and investment in fences and terracing (5 percent). A similar definition of household 
land investments has been used in other studies (Place et al., 1994). 
The second dependent variable TENURE measures if a household head is concerned over 
land tenure security in the area (Table 1). The variable is coded such that tenure insecurity 
equals one and tenure security equals zero. The FSP dataset does not include the method of 
land acquisition, which has been a significant variable in other studies (Place et al., 1994). 
However, this variable is less important in Mozambique as the relative land abundance, the 
weak formal legal institutions, and the uncertainty induced by the war imply that the majority 
of households acquired communal or virgin land. The institutional history of each plot is thus 
less likely to determine current land investment and tenure perception and the variation in that 
institutional history across plots is likely to be small. Furthermore, the social capital variables 
of the FSP dataset help to control for a household’s past land tenure position. 
The third dependent variable AREA45 is defined as the area cultivated in hectare per capita 
(Table 1). AREA35 is its natural log. Cultivated areas vary significantly across years in the 
study area. For example, each household cultivated 2.9 hectare in the study period but only 
2.6 hectare in the subsequent agricultural year. The number of cultivated plots per household 
declined from 3.9 in the study period to 3.1 in the subsequent agricultural year. 
The set of estimates of equations (1c) to (3c) obtained by ordinary least squares (OLS) is 
consistent if no endogeneity is present. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test can check for 
endogeneity in such instances (Rivers and Vuong, 1988, Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993: 
236-42). The DWH test estimates an augmented regression of the original model where the 
regression also includes the residuals of each endogenous right-hand-side variable as a 
function of all exogenous variables. If the coefficients on the residuals are significantly 
different from zero, then OLS is not consistent and an instrumental variable (IV) approach 
should be adopted. The survey IV estimation used below also accounts for stratification, 
clustering and weights matching the survey design of the data, leading to appropriate 
adjustments to the standard errors of the estimates (StataCorp., 1999). 9 
5. Results 
5.1. Post-War Land Abundance 
While fertile land appears to be abundant in Mozambique, land is also considered to be 
unequally distributed at the household level (Jayne et al., 2003). To illustrate this point, Table 
2 summarizes a divergent set of household survey results from various study sites in northern 
Mozambique. The table shows land holdings per adult consumption equivalent (ACE) 
covering the period 1991 to 1996. These results indicate that land inequality exists despite the 
apparent land abundance and that land inequality varies across space and time. However, 
compared to other measures of asset or income inequality in developing or developed 
countries, the degree of land inequality in post-war Mozambique does not appear to be 
extraordinary. 
In the formal test of land abundance, the key variable of interest is ADULTLOG, which is the 
natural log of the number of non-dependent household members in the AREALOG 
regression. Recall that land scarcity implies a per capita land endowment elasticity of 
household size of -1 (that is a larger household farms no extra land per person) while land 
abundance implies a per capita land endowment elasticity of household size of zero (that is a 
larger household expands the area farmed per person correspondingly). 
In fact, the estimated coefficient is -0.544 and the 95 percent confidence interval of the 
estimate ranges from -0.715 to -0.373 (Table 3). Increasing the average household by one 
working adult would reduce the area cultivated per capita by 10 percent. This result is 
therefore half-way between the land scarcity and the land abundance extremes. 
This finding points to the important role played by economies of scale in household size, the 
household-specific transaction costs in searching for, acquiring, clearing and planting new 
fields, and the diminishing returns of extending farm size with seasonality (Binswanger and 
McIntire, 1987). There are two further, war-related reasons why households may find it 
unprofitable to increase farm sizes. First, the war destroyed many assets such as cattle thus 
depriving households of an important complementary production input. Second, the war led 
to a high mortality rate thus inducing uncertainty about future household sizes. These factors 
reduce incentives to expand the scale of agricultural production with changes in the 
household composition. This also explains the sluggish agricultural supply response to peace 
in post-war rural Mozambique. 10 
5.2. Endogenous Effects 
The three regressions and the DWH test statistics are summarized in Table 4. In the survey-IV 
regression for investment, farm size was instrumented using several household and land 
characteristics. There is no suggestion of over-identification: applying the Davidson-
MacKinnon test of over-identification yields a test statistic of 5.20 (which is distributed as a 
χ
2 with 6 degrees of freedom). This suggests that the investment equation is properly 
specified and that the instruments are valid (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993: 236). The 
regressions have good fits with R
2 values of 0.46 (investment) and 0.68 (farm size). The farm 
size equation also serves as the first round equation in the IV estimation of investment. All 
three regressions are highly significant. Variance inflation factor analysis yielded no evidence 
of multicollinearity. While some coefficients are not significant individually at the usual 
levels of significance, each group of exogenous variables L, F, K and V is significant (data 
not shown). 
The empirical tests of the potential endogeneities suggest the following system of equations 
for post-war Mozambique (Table 4): 
(1d) Ii =  f  (  LIi, FIi, KIi, VI, Ai ) 
(2d) Ti =  f  (  LTi, FTi, KTi, VT, Ai ) 
(3d) Ai =  f  (  LAi, FAi, KAi, VA ) 
As expected, farm size has important endogenous effects on land investment and an important 
effect on tenure security in Mozambique, raising concerns about the ability of small farms to 
escape the strong negative effects of the war and about the distributional effects of post-war 
reconstruction. However, land investment and tenure security are not directly related to each 
other, unlike postulated in the literature on property rights in land scarce areas. In the long-
term, as the effects of the war eventually disappear, land will become more scarce. Such rural 
economies would then start to resemble the case studies known from the existing literature on 
agricultural investment and property rights. 
In equation (1d), there is no effect of tenure security on investment (Table 4). This contrasts 
with the traditional literature which concerns peaceful, land scarce environments and which 
mostly does not test for endogeneity. For instance, in Rwanda a positive effect of land tenure 
security on investment was observed (Place and Hazell, 1993). This is explained by Rwanda’s 11 
very high population density which raises the returns to expropriation and hence undermines 
the net present value of investments on insecurely held land. More land tenure security also 
raises land investment in Thailand where the effect works through the credit market (Feder 
and Feeny, 1991). This effect cannot apply in war-affected Mozambique where credit markets 
were non-existent as argued above. Hence the joint existence of war and land abundance 
break the linkage between land investment and tenure security. 
The unexpected positive coefficient for cultivated area in the investment regression points to 
the existence of significant economies of scale in rural production. Larger farms may find it 
easier to produce enough surplus to build up investments and on average they may find 
investments cheaper to implement than smaller farms. Larger farms may also internalize more 
benefits of investments. Other studies of smallholder investment in land quality in developing 
countries have found the opposite relationship, albeit for peace time economies and without 
correcting for endogeneity (Baland et al., 1999). This suggests that war reinforces economic 
inequalities, with larger farms increasing their land investments. Smaller farms are more 
vulnerable to the effects of war and may find it more difficult to escape these effects through 
endogenously generated and re-invested agricultural surpluses. A small farm size may thus be 
a key obstacle to escaping post-war poverty. 
In equation (2d), neither investment nor farm size are endogenous (Table 4). The absence of 
an effect of investment on tenure thus contradicts some recent studies which also corrected 
for endogeneity (Baland et al., 1999, Brasselle et al., 2002). Methodologically, the result of 
this investigation may be due to the aggregate level and binary nature at which tenure security 
has been measured in the FSP survey. If continuous data had been collected on a per plot 
basis, then more accurate estimates of the effect of investment on tenure security may have 
been possible. However, it is analytically quite plausible that in an insecure post-war 
environment characterized by land abundance the traditional chain of causality would 
maintain, as discussed above. 
The positive and significant coefficient of area farmed on tenure insecurity confirms that 
households with larger per capita land endowments experience significantly lower land tenure 
security. This suggests that households are compensated for restrictions in land access with 
tenure security. This finding concurs with various studies where farm size mattered for tenure 
security (Baland et al., 1999, Holden and Yohannes, 2002, Carter and Olinto, 2003). 
However, in some of these studies, the effect had the opposite sign: larger farms benefited 12 
disproportionately from higher tenure security. This effect operates through better access to 
credit, which is of little importance in post-war Mozambique. 
In equation (3d), endogeneity for tenure security and land investment can be clearly rejected 
(Table 4). Investment and tenure security are not determinants of cultivated area and were 
thus omitted from the regression. This result points to the importance of the life cycle and to 
the war effects on assets and markets in determining agricultural production decisions. In 
addition, cultural factors are important as indicated by the very small areas cultivated by 
female headed households. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the effects of land abundance and war on land investment, tenure security 
and farm size. The analysis extends the literature in three regards. First, it outlines how land 
abundance in developing countries may potentially lead to the simultaneous determination of 
investment, tenure security and farm size. Land abundance changes the decision-making of 
farm households and results in household characteristics becoming important determinants of 
farm size. 
Second, the paper demonstrates how war enhances the degree of land abundance by isolating 
households, reducing the effective supply of labor, destroying complementary agricultural 
inputs and raising transaction costs. War may also preserve social structures thus permitting a 
fluent system of land access for most households and inhibiting the formalization and 
individualization of land tenure. 
Third, land abundance is not a universal concept but instead crucially depends on household-
specific and local factors. Two neighbors may be identical in many ways but one might 
experience land scarcity while the other has abundant access to land. Female-headed 
households, for example, are severely land constrained even when controlling for observable 
differences in their asset endowments and skills. 
Methodologically, the paper makes two contributions. First, it emphasizes the importance of 
testing for endogeneity between land investment, tenure security and farm size in the analysis 
of land use and institutions in land abundant areas such as a war zone. Endogeneity may be 
tested by implementing the DWH test. Second, the paper demonstrates that unconditional 
summary statistics of land inequality do not constitute a useful proof of constrained access to 13 
land. A formal test of land abundance is developed, which focuses on the elasticity of per 
capita land endowment with respect to household size. 
Using household survey data from post-war Mozambique, land in Mozambique is found to be 
quite abundant, though farm sizes are also strongly affected by household- and village-
specific variables. The inability or unwillingness of some households to maintain a constant 
land-labor ratio is related to the effects of the recent war. Available land could be more 
effectively used with less uncertainty, more asset endowments and less social discrimination 
(especially against women). Under such a scenario, farm output could rise significantly 
without resorting to intensive production techniques. This is an important policy conclusion 
for Mozambique, where farm output in the early post-war years failed to rise to the pre-war 
levels. 14 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the FSP Survey 
Name Definition  Mean St  Err  Min  Max
Dependent Variables      
INVEST  Number of investments undertaken per household 
in 1995-96 
1.221 0.121 0 4
TENURE  Are you worried about household land tenure in 
1995? 
0.522 0.075 0 1
AREA  Cultivated area per capita per household in mid-
1995 in hectare 
0.433 0.045 0.036 2.900
Labor Variables      
ADULTLOG  Natural log of number non-dependent, resident 
household members in mid-1994 
1.582 0.062 0  2.639
AGEHEAD  Age of household head in years in mid-1994   39.928 1.354  18  82
AGEHEADSQUARE  Square of age of household head in years in mid-
1994 
1749.170 109.202 324  6724
DEPEND  Number of dependent household residents in mid-
1994 
2.045 0.102 0 7
DEPENDSQUARE  Square of number of dependent household 
residents in mid-1994 
6.350 0.510 0  49
EDUINFRA  Total household schooling in years in accessible 
areas 
4.075 1.011 0  41
FEMALE  Ratio of females over total number of people per 
household in 1995 
0.470 0.015 0 1
FEMHEAD  Was this a female-headed household in mid-1994? 0.013 0.006  0  1
ILLDAYS  Total number days ill per household in 1994-95  46.066 10.599  0  433
REFUGEE  Was this household recognized as a refugee 
household? 
0.159 0.046 0 1
TIMEWATER  Natural log of hours per month wife collected water 
in hungry season in 1995 
2.474 0.055 -0.693  4.094
TIMEWOOD  Natural log of hours per month wife collected 
firewood in hungry season in 1995 
1.678 0.127 -0.693  4.094
Land Variables      
AREALOG  Natural log of cultivated area per capita in mid-1995 
per household in hectare 
-1.033 0.089 -3.337  1.065
DISTANCE  Distance to fields in minutes in 1994 per household 40.589 3.206  2  191.250
EASYLAND  Is it very easy to get new land for your household?  0.422 0.052  0  1
PEST  Do most of your crops suffer from pests in 1995?  0.404 0.071  0  1
RAIN  Proportion of cultivated area per household with 
lack of rain in 1994-95  
0.296 0.049 0 1
SOIL  Very high soil quality per household?  0.408 0.053  0  1
Asset Variables      
ANCEST  Does the household have ancestors who were 
buried locally? 
0.844 0.041 0 1
ANIMAL  Household owns at least one large animal in late 
1992? 
0.112 0.027 0 1
ASSET  Natural log of value of assets in real 1996 US$ per 
household in late 1992 
2.925 0.254 0  7.813
AUTHORITY  Is household head in any position of traditional or 
political authority? 
0.071 0.013 0 1
CYCLONE  Was the household affected by cyclone Nadia?  0.332 0.082  0  1
DONATION  Has this household received food, seed or in-kind 
aid? 
0.079 0.027 0 1
ORIGIN  The place of birth of the main man in this household 
is this village? 
0.678 0.049 0 1
TOOL  Number tools per capita per household in mid-1995 0.926 0.063  0  4
Location Variables      
MILL  Do you think there is a grain mill in your village in 
1995? 
0.195 0.063 0 1
YIELDLOG  Natural log of mean yield for cotton per village in 
kilograms per hectare in 1994-95 
6.351 0.134 4.934 7.249
Control Variables      
PRICE13  Paasche price index for purchased food in mid-
1995 
1.093 0.044 0.558 2.682
PRICE14  Paasche price index for purchased food in late 
1995 
0.929 0.036 0.297 2.587
PRICE15  Paasche price index for purchased food in early 
1996 
1.128 0.073 0.333 3.554
PRICE23  Paasche price index for purchased non-food in mid-
1995
1.050 0.059 0.510 2.42015 
1995 
PRICE24  Paasche price index for purchased non-food in late 
1995 
0.978 0.051 0.399 3.212
PRICE25  Paasche price index for purchased non-food in 
early 1996 
1.064 0.038 0.552 3.182
PRICE33  Paasche price index for home-produced food crops 
in mid-1995 
1.044 0.066 0.456 2.736
PRICE34  Paasche price index for home-produced food crops 
in late 1995 
1.096 0.152 0.375 2.473
PRICE35  Paasche price index for home-produced food crops 
in early 1996 
1.299 0.208 0.382 2.618
VILLAGE111  Does this household live in village 111?  0.042 0.030  0  1
VILLAGE112  Does this household live in village 112?  0.042 0.034  0  1
VILLAGE113  Does this household live in village 113?  0.039 0.028  0  1
VILLAGE114  Does this household live in village 114?  0.022 0.018  0  1
VILLAGE121  Does this household live in village 121?  0.104 0.091  0  1
VILLAGE122  Does this household live in village 122?  0.084 0.076  0  1
VILLAGE123  Does this household live in village 123?  0.169 0.118  0  1
VILLAGE214  Does this household live in village 214?  0.047 0.034  0  1
VILLAGE215  Does this household live in village 215?  0.034 0.029  0  1
VILLAGE221  Does this household live in village 221?  0.042 0.033  0  1
VILLAGE231  Does this household live in village 231?  0.035 0.032  0  1
VILLAGE232  Does this household live in village 232?  0.038 0.034  0  1
VILLAGE312  Does this household live in village 312?  0.095 0.086  0  1
VILLAGE313  Does this household live in village 312?  0.072 0.050  0  1
VILLAGE321  Does this household live in village 313?  0.082 0.063  0  1
VILLAGE332  Does this household live in village 332?  0.054 0.045  0  1
Notes: The data is weighted using WEIGHT. Categorical variables are coded to answer the questions 
shown above with no=0 and yes=1, except in the case of TENURE. The variable ASSET was set to 
zero for households holding no assets in late 1992. 16 
Table 2: Land Holdings and Distributions in Post-War Mozambique 





















































































































Notes: The data for the quintiles Q1 to Q5 have been ranked by hectare per adult consumption 
equivalent (ha/ACE) and show the mean ha/ACE per household per quintile and the share of total 
land held by each quintile. All measures refer to cultivated land and resident household members. 
Some percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding. CARE 1993-95: Data are paired. FSP 1994-
96: Data are paired. LSMS 1996: data refer to rural Nampula province. 
 
Table 3: Testing for Land Abundance 
 Coeff  St  Err  Signif 
Test Statistics     
ADULTLOG -0.544  0.084  *** 
DEPEND -0.028  0.060   
DEPENDSQUARE -0.011  0.011   
Summary Statistics     
Weight   WEIGHT   
Strata   CATEGORY   
PSU   VILLAGE   
Number of obs    371   
Number of strata    4   
Number of PSUs    43   
Population size    32540   
F - statistic    F ( 38 , 2) = 665.80  
Prob > F    0.002   
R-squared   0.680   
Notes: The test for land abundance involves estimating the determinants of AREALOG, the natural log 
of the cultivated area per capita in hectare. The coefficient on ADULTLOG, the natural log of the 
number of resident non-dependent household members, can thus be interpreted as the per capita 
land endowment elasticity of household size. The independent variables of this regression are 
identical to the farm size estimation of Table 3. The coefficients and standard errors of the remaining 
determinants are not shown here. The signs of the coefficients are identical to the farm size estimation 
of Table 3. 17 
Table 4: Regression Results for Investment in Land, Tenure Security and Farm Size 
  Equation 1c: INVEST  Equation 2c: TENURE    Equation 3c: AREA 
 Coeff  Signif Coeff  Signif    Coeff  Signif
  (St Err)    (St Err)      (St Err)   
Labor Variables               
ADULTLOG 0.542  ***  1.578      -0.331  *** 
 (0.196)    (0.877)      (0.090)   
AGEHEAD -0.031          0.022  *** 
 (0.028)          (0.005)   
AGEHEADSQUARE 0.000          -0.000  *** 
 (0.000)          (0.000)   
FEMALE           -0.251  ** 
           (0.188)   
FEMHEAD           -0.345  *** 
           (0.077)   
ILLDAYS -0.001    0.998      -0.000   
 (0.001)    (0.003)      (0.000)   
EDUINFRA -0.003    0.939      0.005  * 
 (0.008)    (0.040)      (0.002)   
DEPEND -0.188          -0.037   
 (0.125)          (0.028)   
DEPENDSQUARE 0.024          0.001   
 (0.020)          (0.005)   
REFUGEE 0.206             
 (0.141)             
TIMEWOOD           0.023   
           (0.020)   
TIMEWATER           -0.017   
           (0.049)   
Land Variables              
AREA 1.417  ***  12.477  *       
 (0.504)    (17.420)         
DISTANCE           -0.001   
           (0.001)   
EASYLAND           0.046  * 
           (0.024)   
PEST -0.290  **        0.065  * 
 (0.138)          (0.032)   
RAIN     4.210  **       
     (2.882)         
SOIL 0.010          0.054   
 (0.137)          (0.037)   
Asset Variables              
ANCEST 0.394  **           
 (0.150)             
ANIMAL 0.313  *  1.245      0.091  ** 
 (0.157)    (0.527)      (0.041)   
ASSET     0.983      0.017  *** 
     (0.098)      (0.006)   
AUTHORITY -0.394  **  0.046  ***    0.076   
 (0.170)    (0.038)      (0.049)   
CYCLONE 0.327  *        0.104  *** 
 (0.174)          (0.034)   
DONATION 0.603  **           
 (0.246)             
ORIGIN     0.756         
     (0.354)         
TOOL -0.024          0.085  ** 
 (0.132)          (0.039)   
Location Variables              
MILL -0.327    2.251      -0.074  * 
 (0.234)    (2.682)      (0.040)   
YIELDLOG 0.370  ***  0.052  ***       
 (0.134)    (0.049)         
Control Variables              
PRICE13 0.151    0.264      -0.114  * 
 (0.238)    (0.316)      (0.064)  * 
PRICE14 0.455    1.518      -0.024   
 (0.342)    (1.896)  **    (0.086)   
PRICE15 -0.162    10.521      -0.055   18 
 (0.224)    (9.949)      (0.028)   
PRICE23 1.306  *  264.879      0.140   
 (0.775)    (959.346)      (0.124)   
PRICE24 -0.166    0.112  *    0.024   
 (0.260)    (0.143)      (0.059)   
PRICE25 -0.207    0.144      0.016   
 (0.254)    (0.264)      (0.033)   
PRICE33 0.307    0.007  *    0.281  * 
 (0.588)    (0.019)      (0.167)   
PRICE34 0.267    0.000  ***    0.173  ** 
 (0.176)    (0.000)      (0.081)   
PRICE35 0.379  **  1.535      0.162  * 
 (0.169)    (1.084)      (0.084)   
VILLAGE111 0.691  **  0.048  **    0.418  ** 
 (0.318)    (0.069)      (0.164)   
VILLAGE112 0.066    0.015      0.269  ** 
 (0.579)    (0.046)      (0.131)   
VILLAGE113 -0.399    2.942      0.307  * 
 (0.348)    (5.432)      (0.165)   
VILLAGE114 D    D      0.556  *** 
           (0.153)   
VILLAGE121 1.038  ***  391955.800  ***    0.356  *** 
 (0.351)    (1451811.000)      (0.125)   
VILLAGE122 D    D      0.245  ** 
           (0.096)   
VILLAGE214 1.110  ***  0.247      0.302  ** 
 (0.276)    (0.364)      (0.122)   
VILLAGE215 1.594  ***  0.000  ***    0.128   
 (0.404)    (0.000)      (0.108)   
VILLAGE221 0.627  *  0.000  ***    -0.032   
 (0.370)    (0.000)      (0.182)   
VILLAGE231 1.092  ***  F      0.149   
 (0.342)          (0.127)   
VILLAGE232 0.887  ***  0.001  ***    0.161   
 (0.281)    (0.001)      (0.115)   
VILLAGE312 1.062  *  F      -0.015   
 (0.567)          (0.160)   
VILLAGE313 1.540  **  0.032      D   
 (0.738)    (0.128)         
VILLAGE321 0.766    0.000  ***    0.570  *** 
 (0.490)    (0.001)      (0.208)   
VILLAGE332 0.121    0.001  **    -0.108   
 (0.234)    (0.003)      (0.086)   
Constant -5.245  ***        -0.507   
 (1.198)          (0.320)   
Summary Statistics              
Weight WEIGHT    WEIGHT      WEIGHT   
Strata CATEGORY    CATEGORY      CATEGORY   
PSU VILLAGE    VILLAGE      VILLAGE   
Number of obs  371    325      371   
Number of strata  4    4      4   
Number of PSUs  43    38      43   
Population size  32539.53    28303.67      32539.53   
F-statistic  F(38 , 2) = 791.73    F(31 , 4) = 70.96      F(38 , 2) = 84.24   
Prob > F  0.001    0.000      0.012   
R-Squared 0.455          0.457   
DWH Tests of Endogeneity              
Null Hypothesis  TENURE and AREA    INVEST and AREA      INVEST and TENURE  
  are exogenous    are exogenous      are exogenous   
F-statistic  F(2 , 39) = 1.70    F(2 , 34) = 0.29      F(2 , 39) = 0.96   
Prob > F  0.195    0.752      0.393   
Null Hypothesis  TENURE is exogenous    INVEST is exogenous      INVEST is exogenous  
t-value -0.849    0.640      1.081   
Prob > | t |  0.401    0.526      0.286   
Null Hypothesis  AREA is exogenous    AREA is exogenous      TENURE is exogenous  
t-value -1.841    -0.758      1.104   
Prob > | t |  0.073  *  0.454      0.276   
Notes: INVEST, TENURE and AREA were estimated as survey 2SLS, survey logit and survey linear 
regressions, respectively (StataCorp., 1999). Variables labeled D have been dropped due to 19 
collinearity. Variables labeled F predict failure perfectly and were dropped. The sample size was 
reduced accordingly. In equation 2c, 0 failures and 2 successes were completely determined. Stata 6 
cannot account for survey stratification in logit regressions thus giving misleading standard errors for 
the coefficients of the TENURE regression. The pseudo-R
2 for the TENURE regression is 0.43 when 
implemented as a weighted, clustered logit regression. 
* Significantly different from 0 at the 10-percent level. 
** Significantly different from 0 at the 5-percent level. 
*** Significantly different from 0 at the 1-percent level. 20 
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